A security model to facilitate the recording and investigation of organisational security data is proposed; this model employs a directory structure for security entities and relationships. The model database with associated software may then be employed to develop and display organisational threat networks representing the risk environment of the organisational information processing and communication system. Thereafter the design of the defence systems may be facilitated by interactive procedures to determine appropriate countermeasure structures.
INTRODUCTION
The high cost of data collection for risk analysis projects has tended to favour high level methodologies focusing upon organizational structures ; Baskerville' and Craft et. ae provide detailed accounts of such information security risk analysis methodologies. Nevertheless effective information security risk management for current highly complex systems depends upon a detailed knowledge of the system, and its environment. The Risk Data Repository (RDR)3-7 was developed on the philosophy that risk analysis should be based upon a relatively simple and transparent analysis of comprehensive security data, rather than complex analyses of limited data. It aimed to store security data electronically so as to facilitate security studies and provide an effective means of developing and maintaining security documentation. When combined with a technique for representing the effectiveness of countermeasures", it could form the basis of a security officer's workbench.
Experience with the RDR indicated the requirement for a uniform method of representation for the various security entities and relationships. This paper explores the application of a security model based upon the RDR concepts and a directory structure for entity representation. An electronic security database and supporting software, of the type described in this paper, would not only alleviate the task of security documentation development, it would also significantly reduce the effort of initial data collection and subsequent updating. Moreover a common form of security documentation would greatly facilitate the importation of external security expertise, from vendors, consultants, standards bodies etc. It would also support processes to maintain system security when disparate systems are inter-networked or merged.
SECURITY MODEL

Security Documentation
Security documentation is an essential component of organisational information security because it provides a common source of information to the wide range of staff with information security responsibilities, and minimises the duplication of data collection effort. Such documentation should contain a broad range of information including inter alia business, management, administrative, operational and environmental contexts.
However, the cost of developing and maintaining such documentation is high, and it is suggested that such cost and effort may be reduced if conventional documentation were replaced by a security information database with supporting software. Such database / software would not only significantly reduce the effort of data recording and retrieval, it could also assist the security officer in the analysis of risk scenarios, design and maintenance of information security defence systems etc.
The effective cost of the database/ software design could be minimised if it were widely deployed, which implies the need of a common security model to guide the design of the database. This paper describes a security model for that purpose. The first stage in the model development lies in the classification of the various entities relevant to organisational security (see 2.2).
Classification of Entities
31
The classification of security entities in the proposed model was discussed in a previous paper by Fung et al 9 and was based upon a directory model10. The wide array of entities relevant to organisational security are grouped within classes, and uniquely identified, in the model. It is possible to generate a macro view of the system security by commencing the data collection with high level entities: major sites, large IT and communication systems, major applications and user groups etc. and then refine this view as detail ofthe component entities are recorded.
The proposed model uses but does not at this stage prescribe a directory structure. It simply suggests that an entity: has a unique identifier (an object identifier) indicating its position within its family grouping; has an arbitrary set of attributes defmed by (Tag Value) tupies; can be linked with other entities, and such linkages are themselves entities of the model. A proposed directory system is illustrated in Fig. I . Within this scheme every entity is given a unique identifier (termed object identifier 01) according to its position in the directory"; hence such an identifier may be allocated to an IT system, network, file server, room, class of users or a paragraph in the standard documentation. This classification scheme provides for groupings of entities within classes and hence facilitates a top down approach to the documentation.
Attributes, and Relationships between Entities
The classification scheme described above (see 2.
2) provides a list of entities. Additional information about particular entities (e.g . the protocol of a network) can be given as an attribute ofthat entity (Tag = Protocol, Value = TCP/IP). Hence security relevant attributes may be allocated to entities as the need arises from the model.
Information processing systems involve inter-relationships between their various entities, e.g. workstations are connected to networks. These interrelationships are themselves entities within the scheme (see Fig. 1 ). Relationships thus have object identifiers; a particular relationship is given a unique identifier that is itself, a child of a relationship type identifier. Hence if the model records that a given PC (with object identifier PC_01) is connected to a specific LAN (LAN_01 ) then this fact is recorded with a Relationship 01 (Connect_01.1) belonging to the Relationship family Connect (Connect_01).
Developing the Model
The proposed scheme is capable of describing security seenarios of complex systems down to any required level of detail , but selecting the type of information to be collected, and the requisite level of detail, is no mean task. It is suggested that the process commences with a top level model, explores the risk environment at this macro level and use the results to guide the refinement of the model.
Hence the Systems Entity contains the class Platforms used to represent major organisational systems. A simple security macro model can then be developed by identifying the major security facets of a platform: -its location, i.e. identifying the building or site hosting the platform and linking them with relationship of type -located; -the classes of assets processed by the platform, i.e, linked to the platform with the relationship type -processed by; -the extemal services required to ensure the availability of the platform.
Once a macro model has been developed the security features of the platform may then be explored, using the techniques described in the next sections (see 3 and 4). These studies using the interactive tools described below will then provide guidance on the next stage of the model environment.
SECURITYMODELLING
Overview
Information security officers are concemed with threat events having the potential to damage organisational information assets and systems. They need to predict and prioritise such threat events, in order to develop and maintain cost effective security measures .
A threat tree is such a tool for risk analysis, since it displays the potential set of outcomes for a given threat event. If all the potential threats are considered then a forest of threat trees can be developed, the upper level comprising the initial threats, the leaves the potentialoutcomes. The trees are not necessarily disjoint, since some of the tree nodes may be common to a number of trees, e.g. physical damage to computer equipment is likely to arise from fire, flood, malicious damage etc. Hence the collection of trees may actually represent a network, with intrinsic threats at the top and the undesirable outcomes at the bottom (see Fig. 6 ).
Having identified and prioritised the threat seenarios in terms of the probabilities and impact severities, the security officer has the task of selecting, installing, customising and maintaining appropriate security countermeasures. The role of a countermeasure may be considered to be that of cutting, or at least weakening, a branch of the threat network so as to inhibit one or more undesirable outcomes. Countermeasures themselves are physical devices, administrative procedures etc. that may be rendered ineffective or bypassed, and should often themselves be protected by supplementary countermeasures.
Threat Propagation
Threat Entity Relationships
The proposed security directory system recognises threats classified from top levels (see Fig. 2 ). Each of these threats may be assigned object identifiers (01) according to their position in the hierarchy.
Threats become significant to an organisation when they impact upon a Thus a threat event represents a threat impacting upon some specific entity, and can be represented by a link between the threat and the impacted entity Ols (see Fig. 3 ). The threat events are represented as nodes in the Relationship directory, under the class Threat_Entity: i.e. -TE is a linkage (Threat 01, Entity 01) .
-These linkages are of the class Threat Entity (TE) and each individual TE is allocated an 01 in the model. 
TE -TE (TETE) Relationsbips
Threats propagate, for example: -as fire through geographically related physical environments; -by damaging essential services such as power supplies causing systems to shut down; -by interactions among information processing/ communication systems.
A [Ire in a room may cause physical damage to equipment located there.
In Threat propagation is not inevitable, e.g. there are a number of factors determining if a given piece of equipment will be damaged by fire in a room: size of the room, flammability of materials in the room, fireproofing of the equipment etc. Hence a TETE may have an attribute termed Vulnerability Index (0 <= VI <=1) to indicate the probability ofthe threat propagation.
3.2.3
Threat Tree Development
Threat trees (see Fig. 5 The Threat Tree nodes may be assigned Object Identifiers and henee the Threat Trees are themselves are represented within the model. The automatie development of threat trees deseribed above, however, involves a major manual effort in the production of TEs and linkages between TEs i.e.
TETEs. These TETEs represent seeurity knowledge on threat propagation; the potential number ofTETEs eould be in the billions for a reasonable sized organisation. Fortunately the model provides a solution to this problem, sinee the proposed direetory approaeh organises seeurity entities in classes. Multiple individual TETEs ean thus be replaeed by individual generie TETEs eontaining details of entity classes (see 3.2.4).
3.2.4
Generic TETEs 3.2.4.1 Incident and Target Entity Linking The direetory classifieation of seeurity entities implies that simple relationships exist between eommon entities. Henee loeations will have objeet identifiers that refleet the geographieal relationships (see Fig. 7 ). The generie TETE for fire propagation reeognises that a fire at HQ Site ean spread to the Admin Building, whieh in turn ean spread to floors in that building and from the floors to rooms on those floors. Henee the generie TETE for fire propagation ean be expressed in terms of wild eard OIs indieating parent and ehild relationships of the Ineident and Target Entities (i.e. sites, buildings, floors and rooms ete.)
In general the eonditional relationships between the Ineident and Target Entities may be more eomplex. For example a TETE may take the form : The TETE thus needs to store the Ineident and Target Entities as wild eard representing Physieal Loeation and Hardware entities respeetively. In addition the TETE stores the information regarding the required link between the Ineident and Target Entities, as an attribute of the TETE. The use of objeet entities to identify Relationship classes faeilitates the storage of this attribute information, e.g. LocatedIn. With more eomplex eonditions between the TETE Ineident and Target Entities, a Linkage Condition Table  may be inc1uded as an attribute ofthe TETE. A generic TETE may thus replace a multiple of specific TETEs, and such generic TETEs allows security knowledge to be directly imported to the model. The threat tree development now involves a search for specific Target Entities that: match a TETE Target Entity c1ass, and satisfy the Ineident -Target Entity relationships as specified in Linkage Condition Table. 3.2.4.2 Vulnerability Indices (VI). The probability assoeiated with a specific threat propagation will naturally depend upon the particular threats and entities, and their attributes; e.g. fire propagation will have a higher probability for wooden buildings. Hence VI Condition Tables may also be stored as TETE attributes, to facilitate the estimation of probability assoeiated with a threat propagation between speeific entities.
3.2.5
Role ofThreat Networks 3.2.5.1 Development ofThreat Networks. Threat Trees have a single threat event (TE) root; these trees may contain duplicate nodes implying that such nodes have more than one parent. Combining trees with various threat event roots mayaiso result in the combination of duplicate intermediate nodes. Hence the total set of threat seenarios will normally take the form of a network (see Fig. 6 ). Duplicate nodes are significant in the interpretation of Threat Networks and in the design of subsequent defence systems.
3.2.5.2
Outcome Probabilities. It is extremely difficult to assign accurate probabilities to a plethora of potential information security events. The way forward, proposed in this model, is to allow for the inc1usion of probabilities as transparently as possible, and to suggest the provision of interactive tools to faeilitate the task of probability estimation, i.e. the estimator should at least be given the opportunity to explore the sensitivity ofthe outcome to the estimate.
A Threat Tree provides for a comparatively straightforward estimate of outcome probabilities based upon: -the probability that the root threat event will occur; and -the probability of threat propagation (VI) for each link between the root and the outcome.
The probability of an outcome, arising from a threat event, will decrease with the number of serial links in the path, and increase with the number of parallel paths. Given two parallel paths of different lengths, the outcome probability will tend to be more sensitive to the VIs ofthe links in the shorter path.
An interactive tool that displays the variation of outcome probabilities with variations in the VI of a selected link, would allow a security officer to focus on the links with the highest impact on outcomes and hence prioritise the effort in estimating probabilities.
3.2.5.3
Outeome Impacts. An outcome in the Threat Networks (see Fig. 6 ) represents a threat to an organisational asset, e.g. loss of confidentiality of c1ient account data. The previous sections have alluded to security officers prioritising their efforts towards outcomes with the largest impacts, but so far have not discussed the estimation of such outcome impacts. This task is onerous, particularly if there is a requirement to assign quantitative measures to such impacts.
The fundamental problem lies in the relationship between a technical event, such as compromise to a business dataset , and the subsequent impact upon the organisation. Security officers would normally experience significant difficulty in trying to obtain a host of such quantitative measures from business management, let alone maintaining the validity of such data as organisational environments evolve. This aspect of risk analysis was studied in the RDR development" 11. The approach suggested was:
Defer the allocation of the quantitative measure and assign textual statements to outcomes, e.g. illicit disclosure 0/ this asset could lead to major loss 0/client confidence.
-Deduce impacts from information on impacts associated related assets. The allocation of impact statement to assets can still prove to be an excessive task for organisations with large variety of datasets. Anderson11 demonstrated that given knowledge of the inter-relationship of data items, it was possible to deduce impact statements for a set of data, from explicit impact statements given for a related dataset. The proposed security model facilitates such imputation of impacts.
3.2.6
Automatie and Interactive Threat Network Development
The concept of automatie Threat Network development sounds attractive but it depends upon the initial storage of a significant amount of general and local security knowledge. If the requisite generic TETEs are not stored in the model then the search will end prematurely and a potential threat path will be omitted , giving a false sense of security. Moreover, even if the requisite TETEs are stored, the path will still end prematurely if local entities, or local relationships between those entities, are not ineIuded in the model database. As ever, the model results are only as good as the model itself.
However, the proposed directory structure does provide two ways forward. Firstly, given a common directory structure then generic TETEs may be imported into a local model. Hence a large organisation can effectively export its security expertise from head office to local branches. Moreover a study of the Incident and Target Entity types and conditional relationships for these imported TETEs provides a eIue to the type of entity and relationship that should be ineIuded in the local model. Secondly the proposed model provides guidance on the development of the local security database when Threat Tree Networks are developed in an automatic / interactive manner. Consider anode in the Threat Network with apremature end node in a path. An interactive session can report the eIass of Target Entity, and Incident -Target relationships for each TETE with an Incident Threat event matehing the node; for example, the interactive session may suggest acheck for equipment located in a room vulnerable to flood.
DEFENCE MEASURES
Overview
The previous section discussed the role of the model in providing a security officer with an insight into the organisational threat scenario. Threat Networks display the threat paths to organisational assets and Vulnerability Indices (VI)/ impact statements prioritise potentialoutcomes. The security officer then has the task of prioritising defence systems according to the system risk, expressed in terms of outcome impacts and probabilities.
The security officer is thus responsible for the design, implementation and operation of cost effective defence measures designed to minimise the identified system risk. This section describes how the proposed model may be used in this role.
Countermeasures
A study of Threat Networks can identify branches that have the effect of increasing the probability of undesirable outcomes. Countermeasures are employed to minimise the probability of a threat propagation leading to such unacceptable outcomes. Hence a study of Threat Network branches may assist in the optimum deployment of countermeasure (see Fig. 6 )
Reducing the probability of a threat propagation is equivalent to reducing the effective VI of a TETE (see Fig. 8 ); e.g. if an attacker logs onto a computer system there is a moderate to high probability that a sensitive file stored on the system will be compromised with loss of confidentiality. A password access control system protecting the file will mitigate against such an event. Hence in Fig. 8 Countermeasures are included as Security Measures in the Directory scheme. An earlier publication on countermeasures'' discussed a model highlighting the role and effectiveness of countermeasures. The effectiveness of any countermeasure depends upon its inherent components, and threats to those components can seriously affect the countermeasure performance. For example, a firewall is highly dependent upon the effectiveness of its rules. A logical attack may allow malicious packets to satisfy inadequately formulated firewall rules for access (i.e. bypassing the countermeasure), whilst unauthorised physical access to the firewall hardware could allow the attacker to modify the firewall rules, rendering the firewall ineffective.
Countermeasure structures (see Fig. 9 ) may thus be modelled in terms of: the incident TETE, i.e. the threat propagation to be countered; the components of the countermeasure, i.e. those aspects of the countermeasure that determine its effectiveness; and the residual TETEs, that could impact upon those components, and hence compromise the operation of the countermeasure. The residual TETEs represent potential attacks on the countermeasure components, e.g. lilicit Aeeess to Firewall Equipment CAUSES lilieit Modifieation to Firewall Rufes.
The security officer has the role of protecting countermeasures against attacks on its components, and may therefore deploy supplementary countermeasures to ensure the effectiveness of the original countermeasure (see Fig. 10 ), e.g. an intrusion detection system may be employed to counter sophisticated attacks bypassing firewall rules. The supplementary countermeasures mayaiso be implemented in the form of procedural security, e.g. an access control system may have a residual TETE: Attaeker Guesses Password Causes Attaeker to Gain Aeeess to System and this could be countered by an organisational procedure mandating strong passwords.
4.3
Threat Countermeasure Diagrams (TCDs) 41 TeDs are used to reeord the eomplete strueture of major and supplementary eountermeasures (see Fig. 10 ). A TeD is a tree of eountermeasure struetures with the prime eountermeasure as the root and the supplementary eountermeasures as the ehild nodes. The TeD reeords the rationale of a eountermeasure system. Given that the supplementary eountermeasures will themselves have vulnerable eomponents, and henee residual TETEs, it would appear that TeDs will grow indefinitely. The decision to employ supplementary eountermeasures depends upon their role in the effeetiveness of the root eountermeasure and this aspeet of TeDs is diseussed in 4.5. 
Design of Defence Systems
The eountermeasure struetures (see Fig. 9 ) and TCüs (see Fig. 10 ) fit weil into the proposed direetory strueture. The various faeets of the eountermeasure (ineident TETE, eomponents and residual TETEs) may be alloeated objeet identifiers under the eountermeasure entity, and the nodes of a TeD may be treated in a similar manner to those of Threat Trees. These defenee struetures represent signifieant seeurity knowledge. The eountermeasure strueture provides details of the eountermeasure vulnerabilities; the eorresponding TCDs give adviee on the seeure installation of the eountermeasure. Henee generie eountermeasure struetures and eorresponding TETEs may be imported into the model. The defenee struetures may be developed in a similar manner to the automatie development ofThreat Trees.
The first stage in the development of a defenee system lies in the eonstruetion of generie eountermeasure struetures (see Fig. 9 ). The seeurity designer with detailed knowledge of the eountermeasure determines the ineident TETEs, essential eomponents, residual TETEs ete. These ineident and residual TETEs are developed as generic TETEs (see 3.2.4), i.e. the ineident and target entities eontained in the TETEs refer to a class of systems or physieal environment entities. These eonstruets are imported into a loeal organisational information seeurity model. A seeurity offieer now seleets a link in a Threat Network for the placement of a eountermeasure. This link represents a loeal TETE , sinee it eontains details of the organisational aetual entities, and now beeomes the root TETE of a TCD. An automatie seareh amongst the generie eountermeasure struetures produees one or more eountermeasures with ineident generie TETEs matehing the TCD root TETE. The seeurity offieer interaetively seleets one of the offered eountermeasures and the first node of the TCD is inserted. The ineident generie TETE is instantiated to the loeal entities, the residual TETEs are eorrespondingly instantiated.
The seeurity offieer may then proeeed in a similar manner to the seleetion of supplementary eountermeasures, eountering the residual TETEs.
Altematively eomplete generie TCDs may be imported and then instantiated by the entities of the root TETE . In effeet the warnings and reeommendations eontained in seeurity information broehures ean be direetly imported into the model.
There remains the problem of the depth of supplementary countermeasures. Currently these decisions are made, often implicitly, on the basis of experience and judgment. The model can assist with this aspect of countermeasure design by consideration of the VIs associated with the incident and residual TETEs in the total structure (see 4.5).
When countermeasure systems have been selected and implemented they become part of the total information security model and new equipment and procedures will be added. This raises the question, can the countermeasures introduce new threats, i.e. additional paths in the Threat Network? There is plenty of anecdotal evidence of water damage caused by fire extinguisher sprinklers. Thus the organisational Threat Network should be redeveloped on the updated model to test for such eventualities.
Defence Effectiveness
The role of a countermeasure is to reduce the intrinsic probability of threat propagation, i.e. reduce the VI of the incident TETE (see 4.2); the model allocates an effective VI (VI eff ) to the countermeasure (see Fig. 8 ). The countermeasure VI eff depends upon the VIs of its residual TETEs. Consider a simple password system, and assume that the only means of rendering the system ineffective is to correctly guess a PIN. The residual TETE may take the form Attacker Guesses PIN Causes Access System Compromise. In this case the VI of the residual TETE (0.0001) is the countermeasure VI eff • If there are n residual TETEs, then the worst scenario is that each potential attack on the countermeasure is simultaneously and independently undertaken; the countermeasure VI eff is then given by VI eff = 1 -(l -VI \) * (1 -VI 2) *... *... (l -VI n) If any residual TETE has a VI elose to 1, then VI eff is also elose to 1 and the countermeasure is ineffectual. If a supplementary countermeasure guards against a high residual TETE then that residual TETE value is reduced by a factor equal to the VI eff ofthe supplementary countermeasure. Tools may be developed to compute countermeasure effectiveness interactively based upon estimates of VIs of residual TETEs. A simple grading scheme of high, neutral and low VI can be easily incorporated to assist in the decisions on supplementary countermeasures.
CONCLUSIONS
The proposed model seeks to provide a methodology to assist in the problem of maintaining information security within complex organisational environments. It does not claim to be a simple solution to a complex problem. It does, however, claim to provide a methodology for information security defence design by focusing organisationally available skills and expertise to the local problem, making the most effective use of available system data, guiding the collection and recording of additional security data.
The basis of the methodology is a database of security entities with associated tools , used interactively to develop security insight of the modelIed system, which in turn guides the collection and recording of additional security data so that the model increasingly reflects the organisational security environment. The model facilitates the distribution of security expertise and experience to operational environments. Security officers of a large organisation will now have common tools to capture local data, develop security models for local systems and use those models to improve the local security scenario.
To date experience with the model has been limited to the development of prototypes to test the concepts of Threat Tree and TCD development using the procedures described in the paper. The development of a user friendly package with graphical displays is due to commence shortly.
